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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-2463
___________
GIDGET MOCK,
Appellant
v.
NORTHAMPTON COUNTY, ET AL.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-00183)
District Judge:  Honorable Petrese B. Tucker
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 29, 2009
Before: MCKEE, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 12, 2009)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Gidget Mock appeals pro se from the order of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying her motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”).  We will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further
1 Six weeks after entry of this order and three weeks after Mock filed her
notice of appeal, the District Court consolidated this case with several that Mock had filed
appealing from a Bankruptcy Court order or orders.  We have considered whether the
consolidation order effectively permitted Mock to proceed with the claims raised in this
case.  As the record does not include Mock’s complaint, and the docket prepared by the
District Court in this matter describes Mock’s cause of action as arising under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, we cannot say that the consolidation order permitted Mock to assert the claims
raised in this case.
2
proceedings.
On January 10, 2008, Mock submitted her IFP application to the District Court.  In
her affidavit, she stated that her monthly wages totaled $1,020.00, that she had $100.00 in
a checking or savings account, and that she owned a 2000 Toyota valued at $11,500.00. 
In addition, she has three children who depend upon her for support.  By order entered
April 14, 2008, the District Court denied the motion without explanation.1  Mock
appealed, arguing that the District Court erred because she financially qualifies for IFP
status.  Mock has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
We have jurisdiction under 28 § U.S.C. 1291, see Redmond v. Gill, 352 F.3d 801,
803 (3d Cir. 2003), and we review the District Court’s ruling for abuse of discretion, see
United States v. Holiday, 436 F.2d 1079, 1079 (3d Cir. 1971).  IFP determinations
generally are made solely on the basis of indigence, without regard to the potential merit
of a complaint.  See Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1084 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Although we have noted that “extreme circumstances” might justify denying IFP status to
an otherwise financially qualified applicant, we have not had occasion to define the
circumstances for which such action would be appropriate.  Id.
3Here, the District Court did not explain why it denied Mock’s IFP application.  
Based on the financial information contained in the application, she appears eligible for
IFP status.  If the District Court believed that some other factor constituted an “extreme
circumstance” warranting the denial of IFP status for non-financial reasons, the District
Court should have provided that explanation in the order that denied Mock’s IFP motion. 
On the record before us, we must conclude that the District Court’s determination
constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Accordingly, we will summarily vacate the District Court’s order, and remand this
matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
